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THE EFFECTS OF MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS IN PERU:  
SEMI-STRUCTURAL IDENTIFICATION USING A FACTOR-AUGMENTED 












The main goal of this paper is to analyze the effects of monetary policy shocks 
in Peru, taking into account two important issues that have been addressed separately in 
the  VAR  literature.  The  first  one  is  the  difficulty  to  identify  the  most  appropriate 
indicator of monetary policy stance, which is usually assumed rather than determined 
from an estimated model. The second one is the fact that monetary policy decisions are 
based on the analysis of a wide range of economic and financial data, which is at odds 
with the small number of variables specified in most VAR models. To overcome the 
first issue, Bernanke and Mihov (1998) proposed a semi-structural VAR model from 
which  the  indicator  of  monetary  policy  stance  can  be  derived  rather  than  assumed. 
Meanwhile,  the  data  problem  has  been  resolved  recently  by  Bernanke,  Boivin  and 
Eliasz (2005) using a Factor-Augmented Vector Autoregressive (FAVAR) model. In 
order  to  capture  these  two  issues  simultaneously,  we  propose  an  extension  of  the 
FAVAR model that incorporates a semi-structural identification approach a la Bernanke 
and Mihov, resulting in a VAR model that we denominate SS-FAVAR. Using data for 
Peru, the results show that the SS-FAVAR's impulse-response functions (IRFs) provide 
a more coherent picture of the effects of monetary policy shocks compared to the IRFs 
of alternative VAR models. Furthermore, it is found that innovations to nonborrowed 
reserves can be identified as monetary policy shocks for the period 1995-2003. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
In economics, the Vector Autoregressive (VAR) framework is the standard tool 
to analyze the effects of monetary policy shocks
2. This approach was first proposed by 
Sims (1980) and applied  to monetary policy analysis  by  authors like  Bernanke and 
Blinder (1992), Sims (1992), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), Gordon a nd Leeper 
(1994), Strongin (1995), Lastrapes and Selgin (1995) and Gerlach and Smets (1995), 
Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996), Bernan ke and Mihov (1998), Sims and Zha (1998), 
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999), among others.  
 
Two main issues have surrounded the analysis of the effects of monetary policy 
shocks  using  VAR  models:  (i)  the  difficulty  in  identifying  the  most  appropriate 
indicator of monetary policy stance and thus identifying monetary policy shocks, and 
(ii) the correct specification of the empirical model, which is restricted by the limited 
number of variables that can be included in a standard VAR.  
 
In  general, the indicator of monetary policy stance is assumed rather than 
determined from an estimated model, and is usually  identified through changes in an 
interest rate or monetary aggregate under the control of the central bank. However, 
Bernanke  and  Mihov  (1998)  proposed  a  VAR -based  methodology  in  which  the 
indicator of monetary policy stance is obtained from an estimated model of the central 
bank‟s  operating  procedure.  In  particular,  they  employed  a  „semi-structural‟  VAR 
model where there are  some  contemporaneous  identification restrictions on a set  of 
variables that describe the market for commercial bank reserves, leaving the relationship 
among the rest of macroeconomic variables unrestricted. We refer to this as the "semi-
structural" identification approach. The main result of this approach is that the indicator 
of monetary policy stance may not be uniquely determined by one variable (e.g. interest 
rate or some monetary aggregate) but may be related to a group of variables, depending 
on the central bank's operating procedures.  
 
                                                 
2 As stated by Bernanke and Mihov (1998) and Christiano et al. (1999), the VAR approach focuses on 
policy shocks and not the systematic component of monetary policy or “policy rule”. The main reason is 
that tracing the dynamic response of the economy to a monetary policy innovation allows to observe the 
effects of policy changes under minimal identifying assumptions. An alternative approach to  analyze 
monetary policy is the so-called “narrative approach” (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963; Romer and Romer, 
1989). See Christiano et al. (1999) for a good survey.    3 
On the other hand, the  fact  that monetary  policy  decisions  are based on the 
analysis of a wide range of economic and financial data is at odds with the specification 
of a small number of variables in most VAR models. In principle, the more variables 
that are specified in the VAR, the less degrees of freedom will remain and the less 
precise (higher standard errors) the estimates will be. This is the main reason why most 
VAR models are restricted to a reduced number of variables (up to 6 in most cases).  
 
Bernanke et al. (2005) point out two main problems that could arise using the 
standard VAR approach that considers only a small number of variables. First, it is 
possible that policy shocks are measured with error, mainly because the limited number 
of variables specified in a VAR may not reflect the full spectrum of information used by 
central banks and private agents. In this case, it would not be rare to observe some of 
the  so-called  “puzzles”  that  arise  in  standard  VAR  analysis.  Second,  the  impulse-
response analysis is restricted to the variables specified in the VAR model, which in 
turn  raises  two  problems.  On  the  one  hand,  it  may  be  the  case  that  the  specified 
variables  do  not  correspond  to  the  theoretical  ones
3.  On the other hand,  it is often 
relevant to analyze the response of a wide range of variables that summarize the state of 
the economy.  
 
One way to deal with these problems is  combining the standard VAR analysis 
with “factor analysis”, as recently proposed by Bernanke et al. (2005), which results in 
the so-called  Factor Augmented Vector Autoregression (FAVAR)  model.  Stock and 
Watson (2002) and Bernanke and Boivin (2003), show that factor analysis allows us to 
summarize a large amount of information in a small number of factors. Thus, including 
these “few” factors in standard VAR methodology makes feasible the inclusion of the 
whole range of economic information used by central banks into VAR analysis.  
 
In the case of Peru, the analysis of the effects of monetary policy using VAR 
analysis has faced the same two problems. On one hand, the difficulty to identify the 
indicator of monetary policy stance has been mainly related to: (a) the use of different 
operational procedures and instruments following the period of hyperinflation (1987-
1990), featuring the announcement of an interest rate corridor in 2001 and the use of an 
                                                 
3 For instance, detrended real output (obtained using HP filtering in many cases) may not correspond to 
the theoretical “output gap”.   4 
official interest rate as the policy instrument in September 2003, and (b) the change 
from  a  monetary  targeting  regime  -implemented  in  1991
4-  to an explicit inflation 
targeting regime in January 2002. On the other hand, the partially dollarized nature of 
the economy means that  an even greater number of variables need to be specified 
compared to the existing VAR models, an issue that falls into the second problem 
discussed above. 
 
Previous research on monetary policy in Peru based on VAR models assume  a 
priori an indicator of monetary policy and restrict the number of variables employed in 
the analysis. León (1999), using different VAR models with 5 or less variables and a 
Cholesky  identification  strategy,  provides  evidence  that  monetary  aggregates  affect 
inflation; in particular, he finds that a change in the growth rate of M1 raises inflation 
with a time lag of between 4 and 14 months. Quispe (2000) and Castillo and Pérez 
(2010)  apply  the  Bernanke  and  Mihov  approach  taking  into  account  the  dollarized 
nature of the Peruvian economy. In particular, Quispe (2000) finds that the high degree 
of asset  dollarization  does  not  affect  the power of monetary policy  using  monetary 
aggregates,  showing  that  money  affects  inflation  between  8  to  16  months  after  the 
shock. Rossini (2001), using a standard VAR with five variables, finds that fifty percent 
of  a  shock  to  monetary  base  is  transmitted  to  inflation  after  5  quarters.  Finally, 
Winkelried (2004), using a cointegrated-VAR approach with 7 variables and assuming 
that the interest rate can measure the monetary policy stance from 1993 to 2003, finds 
that a shock to interest rate affects output and inflation after one year, considering data 
from 1993 to 2003.  
 
Our aim is to contribute to the analysis of monetary policy in Peru taking into 
account the two main issues mentioned above simultaneously. In order to do it, we 
propose  an  extension  of  the  FAVAR  model  that  incorporates  a  semi-structural 
identification approach a la Bernanke and Mihov, resulting in a VAR model that we 
denominate SS-FAVAR. Using data for Peru, the results show that the SS-FAVAR's 
impulse-response functions (IRFs) provide a more coherent picture of the effects of 
monetary policy shocks compared to the IRFs of alternative VAR models.  
 
                                                 
4 Armas et al. (2001).   5 
 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we present and discuss the semi-
structural  identification  framework  proposed  by  Bernanke  and  Mihov  (1998).  The 
FAVAR model proposed by Bernanke, et al. (2005) is presented in section 3. In section 
4, the FAVAR model is extended using Bernanke and Mihov's identification strategy, 
obtaining  what  we  denominate  a  SS-FAVAR  model.  In  section  5  we  present  and 
analyze the main results obtained from these three approaches. Finally, we summarize 
our main conclusions in section 6.  
 
   6 
2.  Structural  (non  recursive)  VAR  identification  and  the  market  for  bank 
reserves 
 
There are many investigations that have studied the impact of monetary policy 
shocks  based  on  assumptions  about  the  central  bank‟s  operating  procedures  in  the 
market for bank reserves. Some important papers for the U.S. economy are Bernanke 
and Blinder (1992), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), Cosimano and Sheehan (1994) 
and  Strongin  (1995),  and  Bernanke  and  Mihov  (1998)  who  proposed  a  unified 
framework that nests all these previous studies, based on a small semi-structural model 
for bank reserves. Despite some potential weakness of this approach (see Christiano et 
al. 1999), it is still quite useful to understand the effects of monetary policy shocks on 
the economy. 
 
2.1. Basic Framework: Unrestricted VAR 
 
  It is assumed that the structure of the economy can be described by the following 


































where  t Y  is a vector of macroeconomic variables (non policy variables), and  t P  is a 
vector of possible monetary policy indicators, both vectors dated at time t. The vectors 
y
t v   and 
p
t v   contain  structural  (or  primitive)  disturbances  which  are  assumed  to  be 
mutually uncorrelated; the presence of the matrixes 
y A  and 
P A  imply that shocks may 
enter into more than one equation.  
 
Equation (2) states that the set of policy indicators  t P  depend on current and 
lagged values of  t Y  and  t P , and on a set of disturbances
p
t v . Bernanke and Mihov (1998) 
assume that one element of the vector 
p
t v  is a money supply shock or policy disturbance 
s
t v , while the remaining elements of 
p
t v  may include shocks to money demand or other 
possible  disturbances  that  can  affect  the  policy  indicators.  Equation  (1)  allows  the   7 
nonpolicy variables  t Y  to depend on current and lagged values of  t Y  and  t P . Thus the 
system (1)-(2) is not identified.  
 
One  possible  identification  procedure  is  to  allow  the  nonpolicy  variables  to 
depend only on lagged values of policy variables, which implies that  0 0  C
5. Under 

































To analyze the dynamic responses of variables to a policy shock  s v , we can 
rewrite the system (1a)-(2) as a standard VAR, with only lagged variables on the right-



























where    L ʦ  is a conformable lag polynomial of finite order “q”.  
 




t u  be the portion of the VAR residuals in the policy block that is orthogonal 
to the VAR residuals in the non-policy block, which satisfies:  
 




t v A G I u
1
0
   , 
 
or, dropping subscripts and superscripts:  
 
(5)  Av Gu u    
                                                 
5 This is analogous to the identifying assumption made in Bernanke and Blinder (1992), where Pt is a 
scalar rather than a matrix.   8 
Equation  (5)  is  a  standard  structural  VAR  (SVAR)  system,  which  relates 
observable VAR-based residuals  t u  to unobserved structural shocks  t v , one of which is 
the  policy  shock 
s
t v .  Thus,  given  0 0  C ,  the  identification  of  the  monetary  policy 
shock  s v  implies the identification of matrixes G  and  A.  
 
For this purpose, and following Bernanke and Mihov (1998) and Christiano et 
al. (1999), we consider the following model (in innovation form) that describes the 




IIR TR v u u      
(7) 
s b b d d
NBR v v v u       
(8) 
b
NBR DISC IIR BR v u u u u       ) (  
 
where  u   denotes  an  (observable)  VAR  residual  and  v  indicates  an  (unobservable) 
structural disturbance.  
 
The banks‟ total demand for reserves
6 is represented by equation (6). In this 
equation, the innovation in the demand for total reserves  TR u  depends (negatively) on 
the innovation in the interbank interest rate
7 (the price of reserves) and on a demand 
disturbance 
d v . 
 
The behaviour of the central bank is described by equation (7). It is assumed that 
the central bank observes and responds to shocks to the total demand for reserves and to 
the demand for borrowed reserves, and to exogenous “monetary policy” shocks 
s v . 
 
Finally, equation (8) represents the banks‟ demand for borrowed reserves
8. The 
innovation  in  the  demand  for  borrowed  reserves  BR u   depends  positively  on  the 
                                                 
6 Total reserves is the amount of money held at the central bank by the private banks. Borrowed reserves 
is the amount of money borrowed by banks through the central bank's discount window, in order to meet 
the  required  level.  Nonborrowed  reserves  is  the  difference  between  total  reserves  minus  borrowed 
reserves.  
7 The interbank interest rate is analogous to the federal fund rate in FED system. 
8 Borrowed reserves is defined as the portion of reserves that banks choose to borrow at the discount 
window.   9 
innovation in the interbank interest rate  IIR u  (the rate at which borrowed reserves can be 
relent),  negatively  on both the discount  rate innovation  DISC u  (the cost  of borrowed 
reserves), and nonborrowed reserves innovation  NBR u
9, and on a borrowing disturbance 
b v .  Given  that nonborrowed  reserves  are  the  difference  between  total  reserves  and 
borrowed  reserves,  the  innovation  in  nonborrowed  reserves  NBR u   is  BR TR u u  ,  so 




NBR DISC IIR NBR TR v u u u u u        ) (  
 
Using  the  conventional  assumption  that  innovations  to  the discount  rate  are 
zero






















































































(9)  Av Gu u    
 











































































































1 ) 1 ( 1 1 ) 1 (
1
] 1 ) 1 ( [ ) 1 ( ) 1 (
 
                                                 
9 Christiano et al. (1999) consider this term based on the results of standard dynamic models of the market 
for reserves (e.g. Goodfriend (1983), which provide evidence that  0   . However, Bernanke and Mihov 
assume that  0   .  
10 See Bernanke and Mihov (1998), p. 877, footnote 10, for a discusión of this simplifying assumption. 
11 It is assumed that the supply of nonborowed reserves plus borrowings must equal the total demand for 




(10)  v A G I u } ] {[
1     
 
If we know the values of the parameters 
b d     , , ,  and   (and hence the matrix 
A G I
1 ] [
  ), using the estimated reduced-form residuals  ] [ ' IIR NBR TR u u u  u , we can 
obtain  an  estimation  of  the  structural  shocks  ] [ '
b s d v v v  v   calculating 
u A G I v
1 1 } ] {[
    : 
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In particular, the monetary policy shock 







b d s u u u v ) ( ]) 1 [ 1 ( ) (                 
 
The model represented by (12) has eight unknown parameters:       , , , ,
d d  
and the variances of the three structural shocks. These parameters  can be calculated 
from the estimated variance covariance matrix of the reduced-form residuals vector  u, 
which  is  diagonal  and  has  six  different  covariances;  thus,  the  model  is 
“underidentified”: we have only six pieces of information to find eight unknowns. Then, 
in order to identify the model we need at least two more restrictions (if this is the case 
then  model  is  exactly  identified).  However,  Bernanke  and  Mihov  (1998)  assume 
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(9a)  Av Gu u    
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and in terms of the structural disturbances: 
 





















































In this case, the monetary policy shock 







b d s u u u v ) ( ) 1 ( ) (               
 
Now, the structural model has only seven unknown parameters: 
d d     , , ,  and 
the variances of the three structural shocks, so we need only one restriction to exactly 
identify the model. In this context, Bernanke and Mihov (1998) consider five alternative 
(non-recursive) identification schemes which correspond  to  four indicators  of policy 
proposed  in  the  literature  (each  of  which  provides  overidentification)  and  one  just-
identified alternative which allows a general policy indicator. We consider the following 
ones: 
 
  Model 1: FFR (federal funds rate). Analogous to the one used in Bernanke and 
  Blinder (1992). According to this model, if the central bank targets the interbank 
  interest rate (federal fund rate in the case of U.S.), then the central bank offsets 
  shocks to total reserves demands and borrowing demands. This case corresponds 
  to the overidentifying assumptions  1  
d  and  1   
b , which implies that the   12 
  monetary policy shock is proportional to the innovation to the interbank interest 
  rate:  IIR
s u v ) (      .  
 
  Model  2:  NBR  (nonborrowed  reserves).  In  this  model,  it  is  assumed  that 
innovations  to  nonborrowed  reserves  mainly  reflect  exogenous  shocks  to 
monetary  policy,  while  innovations  to  broader  monetary  aggregates  reflect 
shocks  to  money  demand  (Christiano  and  Eichenbaum,  1992).  These 
assumptions correspond to the overidentifying restrictions  0    
b d . In this 
case, the monetary policy shock is just the reduce -form innovation in the 
nonborrowed reserves  NBR
s u v  .  
 
  Model 3: NBR/TR (“orthogonalized’’ nonborrowed reserves
12). Following 
Strongin (1995), it is assumed that shocks to total reserves are purely demand 
shocks
13,  0   , and that the central bank doesn‟t respond to borrowing shocks, 
0  
b . Thus, these two overidentifying assumptions  imply that the monetary 
policy shocks are given by  NBR TR
d s u u v     . 
 
  Model 4: BR (borrowed reserves). Borrowed-reserves targeting corresponds to 
the restrictions  ʱ/β φ 1, φ
b d   . Alternatively, we can use  0 0, φ 1, φ
b d      
(so that  0    is possible). In the latter, the implied monetary policy shock is 
proportional  to  the  negative  of  the  innovation  to  borrowed  reserves 
BR NBR TR
s u u u v      ) ( .  
 
  Model  5:  JI  (Just-identification).  In  order  to  get  a  just-identified  model, 
Bernanke  and  Mihov  (1998)  consider  only  0   .  In  this  case,  the  implied 
monetary policy shock is a linear combination of the innovations to the three 





b d s u u u v           ) 1 ( ) (  
 
                                                 
12 The name "orthogonalized" comes from the idea that shocks can be identified having total reserves 
immediately  precede  nonborrowed  reserves  in  a  standard  Cholesky  decomposition.  Thus,  the  policy 
shock can be identified as the "orthogonalized" error in the nonborrowed reserves equation. 
13 In the short run, the central bank has no choice but to “accommodate” to total reserves shocks, using 
either open-market operations or the discount window.    13 
Each model presented above is overidentified by one restriction (except Model 
4) with respect to equation (12a). Therefore the validity of any model, can be assessed 
using a test of the overidentifying restrictions. Thus, the rejection of the test
14 implies 
the rejection of the model considered.  
 
2.3. Some general criticisms  
 
Christiano, L; Martin Eichenbaum and Charles Evans (1999), or CEE (1999), 
point out a potential weakness in the identification procedure proposed by Bernanke and 
Mihov  (1998),  based  on  the  test  of  overidentifying  restrictions.  CEE  state  that  the 
rejection  of  the  test  can  always  be  interpreted  as  evidence  against  the  maintained 
hypothesis  0    with respect to system (9) rather than evidence  against one of the 
identification schemes. Thus, CEE conclude that a rejection of an overidentifying test in 
this context is not evidence against a given identification schemes mentioned above; 
this is true only if we have the prior that  0   . 
 
Furthermore, even if it is assumed that  0   , CEE points out that there is a 
problem to test the validity of the restrictions implied by Models 1, 2  and 3, using 
standard statistical procedures. The reason is that the system (9), where  0   , is exactly 
identified under Model 1, 2 or 3, so an overidentifying restrictions test is not valid. In 
this  case,  CEE  recommend  the  comparison  of  the  corresponding  impulse-response 
functions as a strategy to assess the validity of the competing models.  
 
However, CEE‟s proposed solution requires implicitly a correct specification of 
the VAR model, and thus the problem of how many variables should be included in the 
VAR  arises  (although  this  problem  is  not  restricted  to  CEE‟s  criticism  only).  As 
mentioned  in  section1,  a  way  to  deal  with  these  data  problem  is  using  the  Factor-
Augmented  Vector  Autoregression  (FAVAR)  model,  which  makes  feasible  the 
inclusion of a wide range of economic information into a standard VAR model, through 
the inclusion of a small number of factors. In the next section we present the key aspects 
of the FAVAR approach. 
                                                 
14 The null hypothesis is that the specified restrictions implied by a particular model are valid (i.e., the 
specified model is valid).   14 
3.  Factor-Augmented Vector Autoregressive (FAVAR) approach 
 
The main feature of the FAVAR approach is that it allows the inclusion of a 
huge number of variables in the VAR framework, through the use of  “factor analysis”. 
In the next subsection we present briefly the general framework, the estimation and 
identification of a FAVAR model
15. 
 
3.1. General framework 
 
Let  us  assume  that  there  are  a  “small”  number  M   of  observable  economic 
variables  that  determine  the  dynamics  of  the  economy,  contained  in  the  vector  t Y
(𝑀𝑥1).  Then  the  dynamics  of  the  economy  can  be  analyzed  using  a  Vector 
Autoregressive (VAR) model of the form: 
 
(13) 
) 1 ( ) 1 (
1







t v Y L Y      
 
where  ) (L    is  a  conformable  lag  polynomial  of  order  d.  However,  in  many 
applications, additional economic information not included in  t Y  may be relevant to 
modelling the dynamics of these series. Let us suppose that this additional information 
obtained from observed economic variables (time series) is included in a  1  N  vector 
t X ,  where  N   is  a  large  number Furthermore,  assume  that  this “large”  number  of 
“observed” informational variables can be compressed into a “small” number  K  of 
unobserved factors and the “small” number  M  of economic variables contained in  t Y , 
as follows: 
 




t e Y F X       ,  ,T 1, t    
 
where  N M K   ,  t F  is a  1  K  vector containing the  K  unobserved factors, 
f   is an  K N matrix of factor loadings,  y   is  M N  , and the  1  N  vector of error 
                                                 
15 In this section, we follow closely Bernanke et al. (2005)   15 
terms  t e  are mean zero and either weakly correlated or uncorrelated
16. Equation (14), 
called “observation equation”
 17, captures the idea that both  t Y  and  t F  represent forces 
that drive the common dynamics of  t X , thus,  conditional on  t Y , the  t X  are noisy 
measures of the underlying unobserved factors  t F
18. Finally, it is assumed that the joint 




























where again    L   is a conformable lag polynomial of finite order d . The error 
term  t u  is mean zero with covariance matrix Q. Bernanke et al. (2005) called equation 
(15) a factor-augmented vector autoregressive or FAVAR model. They interpret the 
unobserved  factors  as  “diffuse  concepts”  such  as  “economic  activity”  or  “credit 
conditions” which usually are represented by a large number of economic series  t X  and 
not only by one or two economic variables.  
 
As it can be noticed, equation (15) is just a VAR in  ) , ( t t Y F  which nests the 
standard VAR represented by equation (13)
19. This is very important because if the true 
system that describes the dynamics of the economy is a FAVAR, estimation of (15) as a 
standard VAR system in  t Y  will involve an omitted variable bias problem because of 
the omission of the “factors”. As a consequence, the estimated VAR coefficients and  
everything  that  depends  on  them  -such  as  impulse-response  functions  and  variance 
decompositions- will be biased
20. 
 
                                                 
16 The final assumption about correlation of errors will depend on whether estimation is by principal 
components or likelihood methods (Bernanke et al., 2005). 
17 Note that  t Y  and  t F  in general can be correlated in this equation. 
18 Bernanke et al. (2005) observes that e quation (2) can be interpreted as including arbitrary lags of the 
fundamental factors. In this case, Stock and Watson (1998) refer to equation (2)  – without observable 
factors – as a dynamic factor model. 
19 This system reduces to a standard VAR in  t Y  if the terms of    L   that relate  t Y  to  1  t F  are all zero. 
20 Furthermore, a FAVAR like (3) provides a way of assessing the marginal contribution of the additional 
information contained in the factors.   16 
Some examples can be useful to fix the idea of a FAVAR model. Let us assume 
that the dynamics of the economy can be represented by real output  t y , potential output 
n
t y , inflation  t  , nominal exchange rate  t s  and a nominal interest rate  t R . In general, 




t t t t R s y y Y F   . In particular, if we assume that all 




t t t R s y y Y    and 
t F  is a null vector. In this case, the dynamics of the economy can be analyzed using a 
standard VAR model. As another example, if potential output is unobservable (so, it is 
an unobservable  factor), then we have  ]' [
'
t t t t t R s y Y    and  ]' [
' n
t t y F  .  In this 
second case, the dynamics of the economy can be estimated as a FAVAR but not as a 
standard VAR, and it would be necessary to use the information in  t X  exploiting the 




If we could “observe”  t F , then equation (15) could be estimated as a standard 
VAR.  However,  this  is  not  possible  because  by  assumption  the  factors  t F   are 
unobservable. If we interpret the factors as representing forces that potentially affect 
many economic variables  t X , then it could be possible to infer something about the 
factors from observations on time series contained in  t X  using the relationship between 
t t Y F ,  and  t X  given by (14). 
 
The two approaches to estimating equations (14) and (15) provided by Bernanke 
et al. (2005) are: (i) a two-step principal components approach
21, and (ii) a single-step 
Bayesian likelihood approach. The authors mention that both approaches are valid. 
However,  we will concentrate in the first approach  appealing  to its computational 
advantage
22.  
                                                 
21 This procedure is analogous to that used in the forecasting exercises of Stock and Watson (2002). 
22 According to Bernanke et al. (2005), the two methods differ on many dimensions. A clear advantage of 
the two-step approach is computational simplicity. However, this approach does not exploit the structure 
of the transition equation in the estimation of the factors. Wh ether or not this is a disadvantage depends 
on how well specified the model is. Then, to assess whether the advantages of jointly estimating the 
model are worth the computational costs it is necessary to compare the results from the two methods. In 
thier application, the authors mention that the results were very similar.    17 
The two-step principal components approach provides a non-parametric way of 
uncovering the space spanned by the common components,    ' ', t t t Y F C  , in (14). In the 
first step, the unobserved factors contained in  t F  are estimated,  t F ˆ , and in the second 
step, the estimated factors  t F ˆ  are used to estimate the FAVAR represented by equation 
(15).  
 
In  the  first  step,  the  common  components,  t C ,  are  estimated  using  the  first 
M K  principal components of  t X
23
 Notice that the estimation of the first step does 
not exploit the fact that  t Y  is observed. However,  t F ˆ  is obtained as the part of the space 
covered  by  t C ˆ  that  is  not  covered  by  t Y .  This  “netting” procedure  depends on the 
specific identifying assumption used in the second step. 
 
In the second step, the FAVAR, equation (15), is estimated by standard methods, 
with  t F   replaced  by  t F ˆ   .  As  discussed  by  Stock  and  Watson,  it  also  imposes  few 
distributional  assumptions  and  allows  for  some  degree  of  cross  correlation  in  the 
idiosyncratic error term  t e . However, given that the factors are unobserved and what we 
actually use are “generated factors”, it is necessary to estimate standard errors using 






The system (14)-(15) is econometrically unidentified, so cannot be estimated 
from reduced-form information unless we impose two different sets of restrictions: (a) 
normalization restrictions on the observation equation (14); and (b) restrictions on the 
                                                 
23 As as shown in Stock and Watson (2002),when  N  is large and the number of principal components 
used is at least as large as the true number of factors, the principal components consistently recover the 
space spanned by both  t F  and  t Y . Another feature of principal components is that it permits one to deal 
systematically with data irregularities. For example, Bernanke and Boivin (2003) estimate factors in cases 
in which  X  may include both monthly and quarterly series, series that are introduced mid-sample or are 
discontinued, and series with missing values. 
24 Bernanke et al. (2005) implement a bootstrap procedure based on Kilian (1998), that accounts for the 
uncertainty in the factor estimation. Note that in theory, when  N  is large relative to T , the uncertainty in 
the factor estimates can be ignored; see Bai (2002).   18 
transition equation (15) (and potentially on the observation equation) in order to identify 
the policy shock.  
 
The first set of restrictions involve restrictions on factors and their coefficients in 
equation (14). Under the principal components approach, Bernanke et al. (2005) use the 
standard  normalization  implicit  in  that  approach
25:  I C/T C'  ,  where 
)] , ( , ), , [( T T 1 1 Y F Y F C'   . This normalization implies that  Z T C ˆ ˆ  , where  Z ˆ  are the 
eigenvectors corresponding to the  K  largest eigenvalues of  XX' , sorted in descending 
order.  
 
The second set of restrictions are intended to identify the structural shocks in the 
transition  equation.  At this  stage,  we  can  follow  any of  the identification  procedure 
proposed in the literature: (a) recursiveness identification as in Sims (1992), Bernanke 
and Blinder (1992), Strongin (1995), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999); (b) 
structural or contemporaneous, nonrecurvise restrictions as in Gordon a Leeper (1994), 
Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996), Bernanke and Mihov (1998) and Sims and Zha (1998) or 
long-run restrictions as in Lastrapes and Selgin (1995) and Gerlach and Smets (1995).  
 
In their empirical application, Bernanke et al. (2005) treat the monetary policy 
instrument  t R  (the federal funds rate in the U.S. economy as stated by the authors) as 
observable (the only variable in the vector  ) and other variables, including output and 
inflation, as unobservable
26. Then, they use a recursive procedure to identify monetary 
policy shocks:  all the factors entering (15 ) respond with a lag to changes in the 
monetary policy instrument, which is ordered last in the FAVAR. Thus, the innovations 
in the federal fund rate can be interpreted as monetary policy shocks.  
 
To be more explicit, they  assume implicitly that the true economic structure is 
given by:  
 
 
                                                 
25 See Bernanke et al. (2005) for an explanation. 
26 They compare this baseline specification with others (e.g., output and prices were assumed observable). 
However, their results favor the baseline specification. 
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Equations (16) and (17) define an unrestricted linear dynamic model that allows 
both  contemporaneous  values  and  up  to  q  lags  of  any  variable  to  appear  in  any 
equation.  In  particular,  t F   is  the  vector  of  unobserved  factors  (like  real  activity, 
unemployment, potential output, among others), and  t R  the federal funds rate, which 
indicates the stance of monetary policy. Equation (17) predicts current policy stance 
given current and lagged values of the factors and lagged values of the monetary policy 
stance, while equation (16) describes a set of structural relationships in the rest of the 
economy in terms of unobserved factors and the policy stance. The vector  y v  and the 
scalar 
R v  are mutually uncorrelated structural error terms
27. 
 
In general,  the system (16)–(17)  is  not  econometrically  identified.  However, 
following Bernanke and Blinder (1992), to identify the dynamic effects of exogenous 
policy shocks on the elements of  t F  it is sufficient to assume that policy shocks do not 
affect the given factors within the current period, which means that  . Under this 
assumption the system (4)–(5) can be written in VAR format by projecting the vector of 






























                                                 
27 As in Bernanke (1986), the structural error terms in equation (1) are premultiplied by a general matrix 
y A , so that shocks may enter into more than one equation: hence the assumption that the elements of  y v  
are uncorrelated imposes no restriction. According to Bernanke and Blinder (1992), the assumption tha t 
the policy shock 
R v  is uncorrelated with the elements of 
y v  is also not restrictive, because they consider 
as part of the definition of an exogenous policy shock its independence from contemporaneous economic 
conditions.  Bernanke  and  Mihov  (1998)  states  that  the  idea  of  an  exogenous  policy  shock  has  been 
criticized as implying that the Fed randomizes its policy decisions. Although the Fed does not explicitly 
randomize, it seems reasonable to assert that, for a given objective state of the economy, many random 
factors  affect  policy  decisions  (like  personalities  and  intellectual  predilections  of  the  policy-makers, 
politics, data errors and revisions, among others). 
0 0  C  20 
 
If we “know”  t F , we can obtain an estimated series for the exogenous policy 
shock 
R v ,  first  estimating  the  FAVAR  by  standard  VAR  methods  and  then 
implementing  a  Cholesky  decomposition  of  the  covariance  matrix  (with  the  policy 
variable ordered last). In this way, we can obtain the impulse response functions for all 
the factors and the interest rate in the system with respect to the policy shock, which can 
be interpreted as the true structural responses to policy shocks. More importantly, the 
IRFs for any of the variables contained in  t X  can be obtain from the linear combination 
of the IRFs  of  ] ' , ' [ t t Y F , where the linear combination will depend on the estimated 
coefficients of the relationship between  t X  and  ] ' , ' [ t t Y F . 
 
Under the recursive assumption about  ] ' , ' [ t t Y F  required for identification, we 
need an “intermediate step” to obtain the final estimated factors   that will enter the 
FAVAR  before  its  estimation.  Remember  that  the  “ M K  ”  principal  components 
estimated  from  the  whole  data  set  X ,  which  is  denoted  as  ) , ( ˆ
t t Y F C ,  allows  to 
consistently recover “ M K  ” independent, but arbitrary, linear combinations of  t F  and 
t Y  given the observation equation (2). Then, since   is not imposed as an observable 
component in the first step, any of the linear combinations underlying  ) , ( ˆ
t t Y F C  could 
involve the monetary policy instrument  t R  that is included in  . Thus, it would not be 
valid to estimate a VAR in  ) , ( ˆ
t t Y F C  and   (which contains  t R ) and identify the policy 
shock recursively. Instead, we must first remove the direct dependence of  ) , ( ˆ
t t Y F C  on 
t R , and obtained the final estimated factors  .  
 
Before describing the procedure to estimate the final factor, it is important to 
classify the data into two categories of variables: “slow-moving” and “fast-moving”. A 
“slow-moving” variable (e.g., wages) is assumed not to respond contemporaneously to 
unanticipated changes in monetary policy. However, a “fast-moving” variable (e.g., an 
asset-price) is allowed to respond contemporaneously to policy shocks
28. 
 
                                                 





t F ˆ  21 
The final factors, which under the recursive identification strategy should not be 
affected contemporaneously by  t R , can be obtained subtracting  t R  times the associated 
coefficient from each of the elements of  ) , ( ˆ
t t Y F C ; however, this strategy requires the 
knowledge of all linear combinations implicit in  ) , ( ˆ
t t Y F C , which is not the case. Given 
that  they  are  unknown,  Bernanke  at  al.  (2005)  propose  a  strategy  that  consist  in 
estimating  their  coefficients  through  a  multiple  regression  of  the  form 
t t R t C t t e R b b    ) ( * ˆ ) , ( ˆ
* F C Y F C ,  where  ) ( * ˆ
t F C   is  an  estimate  of  all  the  common 
components other than  t R . One way to obtain  ) ( * ˆ
t F C , as proposed by Bernanke at al. 
(2005), is to extract principal components from the subset of slow-moving variables, 
which  by  assumption  are  not  affected  contemporaneously  by  t R .  Then,  the  final 
estimated factors contained in   are constructed as  t R t t t R b ˆ ) , ( ˆ ˆ   Y F C F . 
 
Thus, based on a  recursive identification of monetary policy shocks, we can 
summarised the two-step estimation procedure of a FAVAR model as follows:  
 
  Step 1: Estimation of unobserved factors 
  Extract principal components from “slow-moving” variables,  ) ( * ˆ
t F C . 
  Run multiple regression of the form  t t R t C t t e R b b    ) ( * ˆ ) , ( ˆ
* F C Y F C . 
  Construct the final factors as  t R t t t R b ˆ ) , ( ˆ ˆ   Y F C F  
Step 2: Estimation of the VAR model 

























1       
  Estimate a VAR in   and   with  t R  ordered last in the vector  , so that  
Thus, the policy shocks can be recursively identified. 
29 
 
Appendix 2 provides the basic codes to perform FAVAR analysis. 
 
                                                 
29 The joint likelihood estimation only requires that the first  K variables in the data set are selected from 
the set of “slow-moving” variables and that the recursive structure is imposed in the transition equation. 
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4.  Semi-structural identification and FAVAR: SS-FAVAR 
 
As pointed out by Bernanke et al. (2005), other identification schemes can be 
implemented in the FAVAR framework. A recent attempt is provided by Belviso and 
Milani  (2006),  who  try  to  identify  each  factor  (as  „real  activity‟,  „price  pressures‟, 
„financial  market  sector‟,  „credit  sector‟,  and  so  on),  thus  providing  an  economic 
interpretation to them.  
 
In the case of Peru, it is not clear which is the monetary policy indicator for the 
whole sample
30, so the recursive FAVAR approach would not be enough to analyze the 
effects of monetary policy shocks because it requires a good monetary policy indicator. 
Thus, we propose a simple extension of the FAVAR framework  based on the semi-
structural identification procedure a la Bernanke and Mihov (1998), which exploits the 
information of the market for bank reserves.  
 
The  starting  point  is  the  assumption  that  we  can  describe  the  economy‟s 

































The system (18)-(19) is the same as the system (16)-(17), except by the fact that 
now we explicitly consider a vector    of policy indicators and not only a scalar. 
Following Bernanke in Mihov (1998), we assume that one element of the vector 
y v  is a 
money supply shock or policy disturbance  s v . Equation (18) allows the factors  F  to 
depend on current and lagged values of F , and on lagged values of Y . This last feature 
implies that  , so the system is block identified in a recursive manner. Thus we 
can rewrite the system (18)-(19) as: 
 
                                                 
30  Although  it  is  stated  in  Armas  et  al.  (2001)  that  the  central  bank  used  banking  reserves  as  its 
operational target since 1994. 
t Y
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where    L Φ  is a conformable lag polynomial of finite order “q”. Let 
y
t u  be the 
portion  of  the  VAR  residuals  in  the  policy  block  that  are  orthogonal  to  the  VAR 






t v A G I u
   ) (   or,  dropping 
subscripts and superscripts:  
 
(21)  Av Gu u    
 
Thus,  (21)  is  a  standard  structural  VAR  (SVAR)  system,  which  relates 
observable VAR-based residuals  u to unobserved structural shocks v , one of which is 
the policy shock  s v . This system can be identified using any of the models proposed by 
Bernanke  and  Mihov.  And  given  the  recursive  assumption  that    the  whole 
system (18)-(19) can be estimated as a FAVAR model. Thus, FAVAR can be estimated 
as a VAR in  t F ˆ  and  t Y   and the policy shocks can be identified using the structural 
scheme proposed by Bernanke and Mihov (1998). We call this model semi-structurally 
identified FVAR or SS-FAVAR 
 
The estimation procedure for a SS-FAVAR model is similar to the one described 
in the previous section for a FAVAR model because of the block-recursive assumption 
in  both  models.  In  the  case  of  the  SS -FAVAR,  the  additional  feature  is  that  the 
estimation of the final factors   will take into account the effect of total reserves and 
nonborrowed reserves. 
 
Thus, based on a semi-structural identification of monetary policy shocks, we 
can summarised the two-step estimation procedure of a SS-FAVAR model as follows:  
 
  Step 1: Estimation of unobserved factors 
  Extract principal components from “slow-moving” variables,  ) ( * ˆ
t F C .  
  Run multiple regression of the form: 
t t R t NBR t TR t C t t e R b NBR b TR b b      ) ( * ˆ ) , ( ˆ
* F C Y F C . 
0 0  C
t F ˆ  24 
  Construct the final factors as  t R t NBR t TR t t t R b NBR b TR b ˆ ˆ ˆ ) , ( ˆ ˆ     Y F C F  
 
Step 2: Estimation of the VAR model 

























1       
  Estimate a VAR in    and  , and identify the monetary  policy shocks 
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5.  Empirical results: identifying monetary policy shocks in Peru 
 
5.1. A brief description of monetary policy in Peru  
 
At  the  end  of  the  1980‟s,  Peruvian  economy  experienced  a  period  of 
hyperinflation and high dollarization. After 1991, and based on a economic stabilization 
program  and  the  liberalization  of  the  economy,  the  inflation  rate  and  the  key 
macroeconomic variables were improved. In terms of monetary policy, there are two 
clear monetary policy regimes between 1991 and 2009: (i) monetary targeting regime 
(1991-2001), and (ii) inflation targeting regime (2002-present). The main goal during 
the first period was the reduction of inflation to international levels, which was achieved 
after switching from a fixed exchange regime to a monetary targeting regime, with base 
money (M0) growth as the intermediate target. Thus, annual inflation rate was reduced 
from  7,650%  in  1990  to  almost  10%  in  1995  and  3,5%  in  2000.  However  asset 
dollarization persisted, although at lower levels than in the 1980‟s.  
 
In this new context (low inflation a partial dollarization), and given that the base 
money growth rate became more unpredictable, the central bank adopted an inflation 
targeting (IT) regime in January 2002. The central bank‟s autonomy and operational 
independence made IT design and implementation feasible (Armas and Grippa, 2005). 
As a result, between 2002 and 2008, the average inflation rate was 2.4%. 
 
In terms of operational procedures, between 1993 and 2001 the central bank's 
operational  target  was  based  on  banking  reserves  (Armas  et  al.,  2001;  Armas  and 
Grippa, 2005).  During this  period, the interbank interest  rate (analogous  to  the Fed 
funds  rate  in  the  U.S.  economy)  was  very  volatile  and  determined  by  market 
conditions
31. However, given the low-inflation environment at the end of the 1990‟s, the 
reduction  of  the  interbank  interest  rate  volatility,  and  the  adoption  of  the  inflation 
targeting regime in January 2002, the operational target changed smoothly towards an 
interest rate target
32. Thus, in February 2001, the central bank began to announce a 
                                                 
31 This monetary operational target allowed the central bank to separate the effect of a shock into two 
parts, between the interest rate and the exchange rate (part of the shock could also be absorbed through 
forex sales). See Armas and Grippa (2005). 
32 The use of an interest rate operational target was not desirable at the beginning of the 1990s, when the 
disinflation  process  in  Peru  started.  Armas  and  Grippa  (2005)  point  out  that  the  hyperinflation   26 
benchmark  “corridor”  for  the  interbank  interest  rate  but  still  kept  banking  reserves 
targeting until the end of 2001. However, with the adoption of inflation targeting, the 
benchmark “corridor” was adopted as the operational target
33. Finally, since September 
2003, the operational target is the interbank interest rate, which the central bank tries to 
keep in the centre of the benchmark corridor. Figure 5.1 shows the evolution of the 
interbank interest rate and the benchmark “corridor” since 2001. As can be seen from it, 
the operational target based on the interbank interest rate has been successfully achieved 
since its adoption. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Interbank, Benchmark (Ceiling), and Overnight  
Deposits (Floor) Interest Rates. 
(Percentage points) 
 
  Source: Armas and Grippa (2005). 
 
 
Based on the above discussion, our empirical analysis considers five samples: 
April  1995-  December  2005  (full  sample),  April  1995-January  2001  (before  the 
announcement of the benchmark “corridor”), April 1995-December 2001 (before the 
                                                                                                                                               
environment made communication easier with a monetary target, because the gradual reduction of the 
base money growth rate was a good indicator of commitment to disinflation. In addition, the high level 
and variability of expected inflation do not favoured the use of an interest rate operational target: inflation 
expectations changes would have been a significant noise in the signalling of monetary policy stance. In a 
low inflation environment, however, monetary targets are less helpful because monetary aggregates tend 
to be loosely correlated with inflation in the short run. Moreover, it is difficult to communicate the policy 
stance because changes in the monetary target might be due to expected changes in money demand. In 
addition,  this  target  does  not  favour  the  capital  market  in  domestic  currency  because  the  short  term 
interest rate might be too volatile. 
33 The benchmark “corridor” for the interbank interest rate is a range determined by a “ceiling” and 
“floor” interest rate. The ceiling interest rate for the interbank funds market is given by the benchmark 
interest rate for injection standing facilities. The “floor” interest rate is given by the overnight deposits 
interest rate.   27 
adoption  of  inflation  targeting),  February  2001-December  2005  and  January  2002-
December 2005. The data was provided by the Central Bank of Peru and is described in 
Appendix 1. 
 
5.2. Recursive identification in a standard VAR 
 
As a starting point, we first estimate VARs for the full sample which includes 
the logs of real GDP (LS004), CPI (LS0027) and nominal exchange rate (LS037); the 
interbank  interest  rate  (S001);  and  the  12-months  moving  average  of  total  reserves 
(S002_ma12) and nonborrowed reserves (S003_ma12)
34. Each VAR corresponds to a 
different  specification  of  the  monetary  policy  ind icator:  interbank  interest  rate, 
nonborrowed reserves and nonborrowed reserves orthogonal to total reserves. The IRFs 
are displayed in Figures 5.2-5.4. 
 
Figure 5.2: IRFs using interbank interest rate as monetary policy indicator (recursive identification) 
 
 
In Figure 5.2 we observe that after an increase in the interbank interest rate, output and 
prices  decrease  as  expected,  but  exchange  rate  increases.  Also,  narrow  monetary 
aggregates unexpectedly increase initially, and after five months decrease.  
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Figure 5.3: IRFs using nonborrowed reserves as monetary policy indicator (recursive identification) 
 
 
Figure 5.4: IRFs using “orthogonal” nonborrowed reserves as monetary policy indicator (recursive 
identification) 
 
In the other two cases  (figures  5.3  and 5.4), the “assumed” expansionary monetary 
policy  shock  displays  unexpected  movements  in  output  (orthogonal  nonborrowed 
reserves), prices  (both  cases), exchange rate (orthogonal  nonborrowed  reserves) and 
interest  rate  (orthogonal  nonborrowed  reserves).  Thus,  in  terms  of  the  IRFs,  these 
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5.3. SVAR and the market for bank reserves 
 
Table 1 displays the estimation results for Models 1, 2, 3 and 4 as proposed by 
Bernanke and Mihov (1998) and the corresponding test of overidentifying restrictions. 
The estimates of 
d  , which describes the central bank‟s propensity to accommodate 
reserve demand shocks, are around 1 for all subsamples analyzed (Models 3 and 4) and 
show high statistical significance, implying that the central bank fully accommodates 
shocks in reserves demands. This result is inconsistent with Model 2, where  0  
d . 
There is also evidence that the central bank offsets shocks in the reserve market, as long 
as 
b   is negative and statistically significant. However, in absolute values, the estimates 
of 
b   are much smaller than the estimates of 
d  , which is consistent with the rejection 
of Model 1 in all samples. 
 
The estimates of  and  are positive and statistically significant in all samples 
(for relevant models), except in the case of Model 2 (nonborrowed reserves) for the 
samples 2001m2-2005m12 and 2002m1-2005m12. The implied liquidity effect ranges 
from 25 (Model 1, sample 1995m1-2001m12) to 160 basis points (Model 2, sample 
2002m1-2005m12). 
 
Overall,  these  results  show  evidence  in  favour  of  Model  3  (NBR/TR),  and 
rejects Model 1 (FFR). From Table 1 it can be observed that for all samples, Model 3 
(NBR/TR) is not rejected and Model 1 (FFR) is always rejected; and for the last two 
samples (2001m2-2005m12) Model 2 (NBR) cannot be rejected. However, considering 
CEE (1999)'s observation about Bernanke and Mihov‟s identification procedure, the 
rejection of FFR can be interpreted as a rejection of the implied assumption  0   . 
Thus, to confirm that Model 3 (NBR/TR) is the best choice with respect to the other 
models, we need to compare their corresponding impulse-response functions (IRFs) as 
                                                 
35 It is important to mention that analogous results were obtained for different VARs specifications (more 
and different variables).   30 
suggested. However, this comparison will depend on the non-policy variables to be 
included in the VAR, a problem we will address using the FAVAR approach. 
 
 




The above results were obtained using VAR models which includes only the 
three  monetary  policy  indicators
36  (interbank  interest  rate,  total  reserves  and 
                                                 
36 In order to choose the lag length we use five criteria provided by Eviews 5.1: Likelihood ratio (LR), 








1995:5 - 2005:12 FFR 0.0039 0.0032 1 -1 0.00
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 )
NBR 0.0247 0.0036 0 0 0.00
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 )
NBR/TR 0 0.0237 1.2433 0 0.25
( 0.0006 ) ( 0.0000 )
JI 0 0.0121 1.2385 -0.1540 0.72
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0030 )
1995:5 - 2001:1 FFR 0.0034 0.0031 1 -1 0.00
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 )
NBR 0.0235 0.0043 0 0 0.00
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 )
NBR/TR 0 0.0261 1.2913 0 0.51
( 0.0107 ) ( 0.0000 )
JI 0 0.0093 1.2474 -0.3188 0.15
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0018 )
1995:5 - 2001:12 FFR 0.0034 0.0029 1 -1 0.00
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 )
NBR 0.0232 0.0039 0 0 0.00
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 )
NBR/TR 0 0.0262 1.2807 0 0.41
( 0.0104 ) ( 0.0000 )
JI 0 0.0094 1.2480 -0.2832 0.22
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0011 )
2001:2 - 2005:12 FFR 0.0060 0.0056 1 -1 0.00
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 )
NBR 10.213 -0.0002 0 0 0.39
( 0.9881 ) ( 0.6444 )
NBR/TR 0 0.0245 0.9888 0 0.30
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 )
JI 0 0.0324 0.9893 -0.0175 0.88
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.2057 )
2002:1 - 2005:12 FFR 0.0198 0.0191 1 -1 0.00
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 )
NBR 0.4747 0.0039 0 0 0.68
( 0.3762 ) ( 0.0033 )
NBR/TR 0 0.0260 0.9906 0 0.52
( 0.0046 ) ( 0.0000 )
JI 0 0.1020 0.9871 0.0297 0.62
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0327 )
The estimates come from a three-variable VAR with monthly data. All values in parentheses are p-values, which are below its corresponding 
parameter estimate. The last column presents p-values from tests of overidentifying restrictions based on the Likelihood Ratio test statistic.
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nonborrowed  reserves).  But  after  some  conventional  key  macroeconomic  variables 
(e.g.,  GDP,  CPI,  exchange  rate  and  others)  were  included  in  the  VAR,  the 
overidentifying tests did not provide the same results in all cases considered. Also, the 
implied IRF‟s of a given identification scheme were not quite similar for various VAR 
specifications
37.  Thus, as explained in section 2 and 3, a FAVAR approach s eems 
plausible at this step. 
 
5.4. Results using FAVAR and recursive identification 
 
In this section we apply FAVAR approach to identify and analyze the effect of 
monetary policy shocks in Peru. As a baseline for further discussion, we analyze the 
results  using  the  recursive  ordering  proposed  by  Bernanke  at  al.  (2005),  taking  the 
interbank interest rate as the monetary policy indicator
38. Then in subsequent sections, 
we  extend  the  FAVAR  analysis  using  the  semi-structural  identification  extension 
proposed.  
 
Assuming that the interbank interest rate is a good indicator of monetary policy 
in Peru, the estimation of a FAVAR model  will provide an estimation of the monetary 
policy shock and the corresponding  impulse-response functions  for all the indi cator 
variables contained in  X . For this purpose, we assume that there is only one observable 
variable (the interbank interest rate), a reasonable number of factors, and we use the 
recursive  identifying  assumption  that  the  unobserved  f actors  do  not  respond 
contemporaneously to shocks to the interbank interest rate.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQ). In general, these criteria provided different results, but almost 
always suggested from 1 to 3 lags. The relevant results using either 1, 2 or 3 lags remain the same. Thus, 
in order to standarized the analysis, the results reported are based on VARs with one lag. 
37 We don‟t report these results because of space (and time as well). 
38  Given the recent Peruvian experience, the interbank interest rate could be considered as a good 
monetary policy indicator –and its disturbance as monetary policy shocks- only after the announcement of 
a  benchmark  “corridor”  of  interest  rates  and  the  implementation  of  the  inflation  targeting  regime. 
However, the results will be considered as a good benchmark for discussion.   32 
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Given  a  negative  (contractionary)  monetary  policy  shock,  the  following  effects  are 
expected
39: an increase in all interest rates (LS043, LS044, LS049), and a  decrease in 
real activity (LS004), employment indicators (LS023, LS026), prices (LS027, LS028), 
stock prices (LS032), nominal and real exchange rates (LS037, LS039), monetary 
aggregates (LS065,  LS066, LS078) and credit (LS075, LS076). Figures 5.5 and 5.6 
displays the FAVAR‟s IRFs corresponding to an increase in the interbank interest rate 
(that tries to simulate a restrictive monetary policy shock), for the full sample (1995-
2005) and the inflation targeting sample (2002-2005)
40. 
 
For the full sample, the IRFs seem to correspond to a contractionary monetary 
policy shock. However, for the inflation targeting sample, the response of exchange 
rates (LS037, LS039), lending rate (LS043) and banking credit to the private sector 
(LS075), are not as expected. 
 
                                                 
39 See Christiano at al. (1999). 
40 The results presented in the paper correspond to FAVARs with 3 factors (which accounted for almost 
95 percent of the variation in the 83 indicator variables considered) and 3 observed variables (interbank 
interest rate, total reserves and nonborrowed reserves). For robustness, we estimated different FAVAR 
specifications (considering different number of factors and observed variables), obtaining the same main 
results.   34 
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5.5. Results using FAVAR and semi-structural identification 
 
Table 2 presents the results of the FAVAR model identified using the Bernanke 
and Mihov procedure.  
 
Table 2: FAVAR and Structural identification procedure using Bernanke and Mihov scheme 
 
 
As  it  was  observed  in  Table  1,  the  estimates  of 
d    are  around  1  for  all 
subsamples analyzed (Models 3 and 4) and show high statistical significance, implying 
that the central bank  fully accommodates shocks  in  reserves demand.  However, the 
estimates of 








1995:5 - 2005:12 FFR 0.0031 0.0030 1 -1 0.00
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 )
NBR 0.0850 0.0011 0 0 0.00
( 0.0220 ) ( 0.0005 )
NBR/TR 0 0.0536 1.1880 0 0.90
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 )
JI 0 0.0355 1.1884 -0.0188 0.94
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.2999 )
1995:5 - 2001:1 FFR 0.0013 0.0025 1 -1 0.00
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 )
NBR 0.0400 0.0016 0 0 0.00
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.1398 )
NBR/TR 0 0.0519 1.2025 0 0.07
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 )
JI 0 0.0012 1.4047 -0.1071 0.00
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.8331 )
1995:5 - 2001:12 FFR 0.0021 0.0022 1 -1 0.00
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 )
NBR 0.0400 -0.0001 0 0 0.00
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.8512 )
NBR/TR 0 0.0501 1.1991 0 0.17
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 )
JI 0 0.0012 1.3312 0.2030 0.00
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 ) ( 1.9955 )
2001:2 - 2005:12 FFR 0.0073 0.0059 1 -1 0.00
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 )
NBR 0.1071 0.0006 0 0 0.00
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.5808 )
NBR/TR 0 0.1334 0.9869 0 0.83
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 )
JI 0 0.0888 0.9876 -0.0028 0.64
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.6102 )
2002:1 - 2005:12 FFR 0.0209 0.0186 1 -1 0.00
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 )
NBR 0.2946 0.0057 0 0 0.00
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.1038 )
NBR/TR 0 0.3703 0.9925 0 0.03
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 )
JI 0 0.2492 0.9870 0.0141 0.52
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0108 )
The estimates come from a three-factor FAVAR with monthly data. All values in parentheses are p-values, which are below its corresponding 
parameter estimate. The last column presents p-values from tests of overidentifying restrictions based on the Likelihood Ratio test statistic.
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no  significant,  meaning  that  the  central  bank  does  not  offset  shocks  in  the  reserve 
market.  
 
The estimates of   and  are mostly positive and statistically significant in all 
samples and relevant models. However, in the case of Model 2 (nonborrowed reserves) 
 is not statistically significant for all samples (except the whole sample). The implied 
liquidity effect (considering Model 1) ranges from 25 (sample 2002m1-2005m12) to 
260 basis points (sample 1995m5-2001m1). 
 
Then, unlike Table 1, the results presented in Table 2 show evidence only in 
favour of Model 3 (NBR/TR). First, the test of overidentifying restrictions cannot be 
rejected for this model in all samples considered. Second, the estimates of 
b   in Model 
4 (JI) are statistically not significant for all samples. 
 
Furthermore, Model 3 (NBR/TR) is consistent with the evolution of monetary 
policy in Peru described in section 5.1, at least until September 2003, in which the 
Central Bank of Peru announce the use of the interbank interest rate as its operational 
target. This conjecture is supported by the results displayed in Table 3, where Model 3 
(NBR/TR) cannot be rejected considering data just before August 2003. 
 













FFR 0.0026 0.0026 1 -1 0.00
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 )
NBR 0.3320 0.0003 0 0 0.00
( 0.5823 ) ( 0.3384 )
NBR/TR 0 0.0520 1.2053 0 0.49
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 )
JI 0 0.0340 1.1986 -0.0416 0.52
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0674 )  37 
There remains the possibility that the rejection of FFR and NBR models can be 
interpreted  as  a  rejection  of  the  implied  assumption  0     (CEE,  1999).  Thus,  to 
confirm that Model 3 (NBR/TR) is the best choice with respect to the other models 
(given  the  data  at  hand),  we  need  to compare  their  corresponding  impulse-response 
functions (IRFs) as suggested by CEE (1999).     
 
Figure  5.7  show  the  FAVAR‟s  impulse-response  functions  based  on  the 
structural  identification  of  the  monetary  policy  shocks  corresponding  to  Model  3 




An inspection of  the IRFs associated to Model 3  (Figure 5.7) suggests that 
responses are consistent with the expected effects of an expansionary monetary policy 
shock. Real output (LS004) increases by almost three times the increase observe d in 
employment indicators. CPI and core CPI (LS027, LS028) increase as well as stock 
prices  (LS032),  exchange  rates  (LS037,  LS039),  base  money  (LS078),  currency 
(LS065), money  (LS066) and credit aggregates  (LS075, LS076). However, it is not 
clear the expected effect on the dollarization ratio
42; in this case, the IRFs show that an 
expansionary monetary policy tends to increase  dollarization ratios (LS057, LS061). 
Unlike this results, the IRFs for  Models 1 and 2 display many inconsistencies. Thus, 
empirical evidence for the case of Peru tends to support Model 3 (NBR/TR)  for the 
identification and analysis of monetary policy shocks.  
 
Finally,  we  can  observe  that  for  the  full  sample  the  shape  of  the  IRFs 
corresponding to Model 3 (NBR/TR) are similar to the baseline IRFs (Figure 5.5) based 
on  recursive  identification.  However,  for  different  subsamples  they  differ
43.  In 
particular, for samples  ending before  September  2003, IRFs associated to Model 3 
outperform the ones corresponding to the baseline FAVAR. And for samples beginning 
after the first announcement of the benchmark “corridor”, the baseline IRFs outperform 
their competitors.  
 
 
                                                 
41 Confidence bands were construted using standard bootstrapping techniques. 
42 However, the IRFs are the same as the baseline results presented in section 5.4. 
43 We have not include these IRF to avoid an excessive number of figures.    38 
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6. Conclusions 
 
The main purpose of the present paper was to contribute to the discussion about 
the analysis of the effects of monetary policy shocks in Peru, incorporating two main 
issues that have hampered the analysis of the effects of monetary policy shocks using 
VAR models: (i) the difficulty in identifying the most appropriate indicator of monetary 
policy  stance  and  thus  identifying  monetary  policy  shocks,  and  (ii)  the  correct 
specification  of  the  empirical  model,  which  is  restricted  by  the  limited  number  of 
variables that can be included in a standard VAR.  
 
First, we have applied the Factor-Augmented Vector Autoregressive (FAVAR) 
approach  and  explored  the  implications  of  abandoning  the  recursive  identification 
assumption  within  this  framework,  incorporating  the  “semi-structural”  identification 
procedure  proposed  by  Bernanke  and  Mihov  (1998).  Our  results  suggest  that  this 
extension may contribute to the analysis of the effects of monetary policy shocks. In the 
case of Peru, the “ortogonalized” nonborrowed reserves model is a good description of 
the Peruvian central bank‟s operating procedures before the use of an official interest 
rate as the explicit monetary policy instrument (1995-2003). In particular, the results 
show  that  "orthogonalized"  innovations  to  nonborrowed  reserves  are  identified  as 
monetary policy shocks.   
 
 
   40 
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Appendix 1: Data description 
 
All data were provided by the Central Bank of Peru. The sample runs from April 1995 
until December 2005, except for total reserves and nonborrowed reserves (1994-2005). 
The first  column displays the classification of  the series;  second and third columns 
display “short” and “extended” names of each series. The last column indicates the 
transformations apply to each series to compute principal components, according to the 
following codes: “1” no transformation; “2” first difference; “3” twelve-months moving 
average; “4” logarithm; “5” first difference of logarithm. An asterisk “*” indicates that 









Monetary policy indicators s001 Interbank interest rate 1
s002 Total Reserves 3
s003 Nonborrowed Reserves 3
Real output and income s004 GDP (index 1994=100) 5 *
 (slow-moving variables) s005 Primary Sectors gross value added (index 1994=100) 5 *
s006 Non-primary Sectors gross value added (index 1994=100) 5 *
s007 Domestic Demand Indicator (index 1994=100) 5 *
s008 Agriculture and Livestock (index 1994=100) 5 *
s009 Agriculture (index 1994=100) 5 *
s010 Livestock (index 1994=100) 5 *
s011 Fishing (index 1994=100) 5 *
s012 Minig and fuel (index 1994=100) 5 *
s013 Metals (index 1994=100) 5 *
s014 Fuel (index 1994=100) 5 *
s015 Manufacturing (index 1994=100) 5 *
s016 Manufacturing based on row materials (index 1994=100) 5 *
s017 Non Primary Manufacturing (index 1994=100) 5 *
s018 Construction (index 1994=100) 5 *
s019 Commerce (index 1994=100) 5 *
s020 Electricity and water (index 1994=100) 5 *
s021 Other services (index 1994=100) 5 *
s022 Gross Value Added (index 1994=100) 5 *
Employment and hours  s023 Lima employment index, 100 and more workers. 5 *
(slow-moving variables) s024 Lima employment index, 100 and more workers.-Manufacturing 5 *
s025 Lima employment index, 100 and more workers. -Commerce 5 *
s026 Lima employment index, 100 and more workers. -Services 5 *
Price indexes s027 Lima CPI (Dec. 2001=100) 5
(slow-moving variables) s028 Lima Core CPI (Dec. 2001=100) 5
s029 Lima tradables CPI (Dec. 2001 = 100) 5
s030 Lima non-tradables CPI (Dec. 2001 = 100) 5
Stock prices s031 Lima S.E. General Index (Dec. 1991=100) 5
(fast-moving variables) s032 Lima S.E. Selective General Index (Dec. 1991=100) 5
s033 Lima S.E. Market capitalization (mill. S/.) 5
s034 Stock Exchange Trading Volume Equities (mill. S/.) 5
s035 Stock Exchange Trading Volume Fixed-Income Instruments (mill. S/.) 5
s036 Lima S.E. Market capitalization (mill. US$) 5
Exchange rates s037 Banking nominal exchange rate (Nuevo Sol per Dollar) - Ask 5
(fast-moving variables) s038 Multilateral Real Exchange Rate Index (Base: 1994) 5
s039 Bilateral Real Exchange Rate Index (Base: 1994) 5
s040 Banking Nominal Exchange Rate (Average Period) Bid  5
s041 InterBanking Nominal Exchange Rate - (Average Period) Bid  5
s042 InterBanking Nomial Exchange Rate - (Average Period) Ask 5
Interest rates s043 Average Lending Interest Rate (Domestic Currency - Annual effective rates) 1
(fast-moving variables) s044 Average Deposit Interest Rate (Domestic Currency - Annual effective rates) 1
s045 Average Lending Interest Raet (Foreing Currency, US$ - Annual effective rates)  1
s046 Average Deposit Intereset Rate (Foreing Currency, US$ -Annual effective rates) 1
s047 Effective Savings Interest Rates in domestic currency 1
s048 Effective Savings Interest Rates in foreing currency 1
s049 Intereset rate of BCRP's certificates (stock)  1
s050 Other rates 1
Money, credit and other s051 Total Broad Money of  financial System (mill. S/.) 5 *
quantity aggregates s052 Broad Money of  Financial System S/. (mill. S/.) 5 *
(fast-moving variables) s053 Broad Money of  financial System US$ (mill. US$) 5
s054 Money  of Financial System (mill. S/.) 5
s055 Quasi-Money of Financial System - Pension Funds (mill. S/.) 5
s056 Quasi-Money of Financial Sytem - Savings in Local Currency (mill. S/.) 5
s057 Dollarization Ratio (Financial System, %)  5
s058 Total Broad Money of Banking System (mill. S/.) 5 *
s059 Broad Money in Domestic Currency of  Banking System (mill. S/.) 5 *
s060 Broad Money in Foreing Currency of  Banking System (mill. US$) 5
s061 Dollarization Ratio (Banking System, %)  5
s062 Currency of  Banking System (mill. S/.) 5 *
s063 Money of the Banking System (mill. S/.) 5 *
s064 Quasi-money in domestic currency of Banking System (mill. S/.) 5
s065 Currency of  Banking System (average - mill. S/.) 5 *
s066 Money of Banking System (average - mill. S/.) 5 *
s067 Quasi-Money of Banking System (average - mill. S/.) 5
s068 Total Broad Money of Banking System (average - mill. S/.) 5 *
s069 Broad Money in Domestic Currency of  Banking System (average - mill. S/.) 5 *
s070 Broad Money in Foreing Currency of  Banking System  (average - mill. US$) 5
s071 Total Credit of the Financial System to the Private Sector (mill. S/.) 5
s072 Credit of the Financial System to the Private Sector in Domestic Currency (mill. S/.) 5
s073 Credit of the Financial System to the Private Sector in Foreing Currency  (mill. US$) 5
s074 Total Credit of the Banking System to the Private Sector (mill. S/.) 5
s075 Credit of the Banking System to the Private Sector in Domestic Currency(mill. S/.) 5
s076 Credit of the Banking System to the Private Sector in Foreing Currency (mill. US$) 5
s077 Monetary Base (Stocks - mill. S/.) 5 *
s078 Monetary Base (average - mill. S/.) 5 *
s079 Stocks of BCRP Certificates of Deposit (CDR) (mill. S/.) 5
s080 Net International Reserves (mill. US$) 5
s081 Gross International Reserves (mill. US$) 5
s082 Foreing Exchange Operations (mill. US$) 5
s083 Net International Position (mill. US$) 5  45 
   
Monetary policy indicators s001 Interbank interest rate 1
s002 Total Reserves 3
s003 Nonborrowed Reserves 3
Real output and income s004 GDP (index 1994=100) 5 *
 (slow-moving variables) s005 Primary Sectors gross value added (index 1994=100) 5 *
s006 Non-primary Sectors gross value added (index 1994=100) 5 *
s007 Domestic Demand Indicator (index 1994=100) 5 *
s008 Agriculture and Livestock (index 1994=100) 5 *
s009 Agriculture (index 1994=100) 5 *
s010 Livestock (index 1994=100) 5 *
s011 Fishing (index 1994=100) 5 *
s012 Minig and fuel (index 1994=100) 5 *
s013 Metals (index 1994=100) 5 *
s014 Fuel (index 1994=100) 5 *
s015 Manufacturing (index 1994=100) 5 *
s016 Manufacturing based on row materials (index 1994=100) 5 *
s017 Non Primary Manufacturing (index 1994=100) 5 *
s018 Construction (index 1994=100) 5 *
s019 Commerce (index 1994=100) 5 *
s020 Electricity and water (index 1994=100) 5 *
s021 Other services (index 1994=100) 5 *
s022 Gross Value Added (index 1994=100) 5 *
Employment and hours  s023 Lima employment index, 100 and more workers. 5 *
(slow-moving variables) s024 Lima employment index, 100 and more workers.-Manufacturing 5 *
s025 Lima employment index, 100 and more workers. -Commerce 5 *
s026 Lima employment index, 100 and more workers. -Services 5 *
Price indexes s027 Lima CPI (Dec. 2001=100) 5
(slow-moving variables) s028 Lima Core CPI (Dec. 2001=100) 5
s029 Lima tradables CPI (Dec. 2001 = 100) 5
s030 Lima non-tradables CPI (Dec. 2001 = 100) 5
Stock prices s031 Lima S.E. General Index (Dec. 1991=100) 5
(fast-moving variables) s032 Lima S.E. Selective General Index (Dec. 1991=100) 5
s033 Lima S.E. Market capitalization (mill. S/.) 5
s034 Stock Exchange Trading Volume Equities (mill. S/.) 5
s035 Stock Exchange Trading Volume Fixed-Income Instruments (mill. S/.) 5
s036 Lima S.E. Market capitalization (mill. US$) 5
Exchange rates s037 Banking nominal exchange rate (Nuevo Sol per Dollar) - Ask 5
(fast-moving variables) s038 Multilateral Real Exchange Rate Index (Base: 1994) 5
s039 Bilateral Real Exchange Rate Index (Base: 1994) 5
s040 Banking Nominal Exchange Rate (Average Period) Bid  5
s041 InterBanking Nominal Exchange Rate - (Average Period) Bid  5
s042 InterBanking Nomial Exchange Rate - (Average Period) Ask 5
Interest rates s043 Average Lending Interest Rate (Domestic Currency - Annual effective rates) 1
(fast-moving variables) s044 Average Deposit Interest Rate (Domestic Currency - Annual effective rates) 1
s045 Average Lending Interest Raet (Foreing Currency, US$ - Annual effective rates)  1
s046 Average Deposit Intereset Rate (Foreing Currency, US$ -Annual effective rates) 1
s047 Effective Savings Interest Rates in domestic currency 1
s048 Effective Savings Interest Rates in foreing currency 1
s049 Intereset rate of BCRP's certificates (stock)  1
s050 Other rates 1
Money, credit and other s051 Total Broad Money of  financial System (mill. S/.) 5 *
quantity aggregates s052 Broad Money of  Financial System S/. (mill. S/.) 5 *
(fast-moving variables) s053 Broad Money of  financial System US$ (mill. US$) 5
s054 Money  of Financial System (mill. S/.) 5
s055 Quasi-Money of Financial System - Pension Funds (mill. S/.) 5
s056 Quasi-Money of Financial Sytem - Savings in Local Currency (mill. S/.) 5
s057 Dollarization Ratio (Financial System, %)  5
s058 Total Broad Money of Banking System (mill. S/.) 5 *
s059 Broad Money in Domestic Currency of  Banking System (mill. S/.) 5 *
s060 Broad Money in Foreing Currency of  Banking System (mill. US$) 5
s061 Dollarization Ratio (Banking System, %)  5
s062 Currency of  Banking System (mill. S/.) 5 *
s063 Money of the Banking System (mill. S/.) 5 *
s064 Quasi-money in domestic currency of Banking System (mill. S/.) 5
s065 Currency of  Banking System (average - mill. S/.) 5 *
s066 Money of Banking System (average - mill. S/.) 5 *
s067 Quasi-Money of Banking System (average - mill. S/.) 5
s068 Total Broad Money of Banking System (average - mill. S/.) 5 *
s069 Broad Money in Domestic Currency of  Banking System (average - mill. S/.) 5 *
s070 Broad Money in Foreing Currency of  Banking System  (average - mill. US$) 5
s071 Total Credit of the Financial System to the Private Sector (mill. S/.) 5
s072 Credit of the Financial System to the Private Sector in Domestic Currency (mill. S/.) 5
s073 Credit of the Financial System to the Private Sector in Foreing Currency  (mill. US$) 5
s074 Total Credit of the Banking System to the Private Sector (mill. S/.) 5
s075 Credit of the Banking System to the Private Sector in Domestic Currency(mill. S/.) 5
s076 Credit of the Banking System to the Private Sector in Foreing Currency (mill. US$) 5
s077 Monetary Base (Stocks - mill. S/.) 5 *
s078 Monetary Base (average - mill. S/.) 5 *
s079 Stocks of BCRP Certificates of Deposit (CDR) (mill. S/.) 5
s080 Net International Reserves (mill. US$) 5
s081 Gross International Reserves (mill. US$) 5
s082 Foreing Exchange Operations (mill. US$) 5
s083 Net International Position (mill. US$) 5  46 
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